I
Judah and Shelah [3] proved that countable support iterations of proper 1 forcings preserve the ω ω -bounding property (see 2.2 here). In his book Proper and Improper Forcing [8, XVIII §3] Shelah gave several cases of general preservation theorems for proper countable support iterations (the proofs tend to be hard to digest, though). In this paper we deal with "Case A".
A simplified version of this case appeared in Section 5 of the first author's Tools for your forcing constructions [2] . This version uses the additional requirement that every iterand adds a new real. Note that this requirement is met in most applications, but the case of forcings "not adding reals" has important applications as well (and note that not adding reals is generally not preserved under proper countable support iterations).
A proof of the iteration theorem without this additional requirement appeared in [5] and was copied into Set Theory of the Reals [1] (as "first preservation theorem" 6.1.B), but Schlindwein pointed out a problem in this proof. 2 In this paper, we generalize the proof of [2] .
We thank Chaz Schlindwein for finding the problems in the existing proofs and bringing them to our attention.
T T
Fix a sequence of increasing arithmetical two-place relations (R j ) j∈ω on ω ω . Let R be the union of the R j . Assume
• C ≔ { f ∈ ω ω : f R η for some η ∈ ω ω } is closed, • { f ∈ ω ω : f R j η} is closed for all j ∈ ω, η ∈ ω ω , and • for every countable N there is an η such that f R η for all f ∈ N ∩ C (in this case we say "η covers N").
•f * ≔ ( f * 1 , . . . , f * k ) is a P-interpretation off ≔ (˜f 1 , . . . ,˜f k ) under p, if f * i ∈ ω ω ,˜f i is a P-name for an element of C, and there is an decreasing chain p ≥ p 0 ≥ p 1 ≥ . . . of conditions in P such that p i forces˜f 1 ↾i = f * 1 ↾i & . . . &˜f k ↾i = f * k ↾i.
• A forcing notion P is weakly preserving, if for all N ≺ H(χ) countable, η covering N, p ∈ N, there is an N-generic q ≤ p which forces that η covers N[G P ].
• A forcing notion P is preserving, if for all N ≺ H(χ) countable, η covering N, p ∈ N, and f * ,f ∈ N such thatf * is a P-interpretation off under p, there is an N-generic q ≤ p which forces that η covers N[G P ] and moreover that f * i R j η implies˜f i R j η for all i ≤ k, j ∈ ω.
• A forcing notion P is densely preserving if there is a dense subforcing Q ⊆ P which is preserving.
Note that iff * is an interpretation, then f * l ∈ C (since C is closed). The simplest example is that of ω ω -bounding:
To cover a family of functions means to dominate it. P is weakly preserving iff P is ω ω -bounding. 3 This example is typical in the sense that often R describes a covering property of the
The property "weakly preserving" is invariant under equivalent forcings. I.e. if P forces that there is a Q-generic filter over V and Q forces the same for P, then Q is weakly preserving iff P is weakly preserving. 4 The notion "preserving" however does not seem to be invariant. 5 It even seems that "densely preserving" does not imply "preserving". (Although we do not have an example. It is not important after all.) One direction however is clear:
Fact 2.3. If P is preserving and Q ⊆ P is dense, then Q is preserving.
We could definef * to be a "weak interpretation" of˜f under p by requiring that the truth value of˜f ↾m = f * ↾m is positive (under p) for all n. This would lead to a notion "strongly preserving". This notion is invariant under dense subforcings, and it is easy to see that Q is strongly preserving iff ro(Q) is preserving (which implies that Q is preserving by Fact 2.3).
For some instances of R, weakly preserving is equivalent to preserving (and therefore to strongly preserving as well). Most notably this is the case for ω ω -bounding (see [2, 6.5] ). For other instances of R (e.g. Lebesgue positivity, cf. [4] ) "P is preserving" is equivalent to some other property invariant under equivalent forcings (and therefore again equivalent to "P is strongly preserving").
We will show that densely preserving is preserved under proper countable support iterations. This is our version of the theorem known as "tools preservation" [2, Sec. 5], "Case A" [8, XVIII §3] or the "first preservation theorem" [1, 6.1.B]:
3 P is ω ω -bounding if for all P-names˜f ∈ ω ω and p ∈ P there is a q ≤ p and g ∈ ω ω such that q ˜f (m) < g(m) for all m. So if P is ω ω -bounding, η covers N,˜f ∈ N and G is N-generic, then˜f [G] is dominated by some g ∈ N and therefore by η. If on the other hand P is weakly preserving,˜f a P-name and p ∈ P, then there is a N ≺ H(χ) containing p and˜f . Pick an η ∈ V covering N. So if q ≤ p is as in the definition of weakly preserving, then q forces that η dominates˜f . 4 This is analogous (and can be shown analogously) to the following fact: P is proper (i.e. proper for all
The reason is that the notion of interpretation is not invariant. Given a forcing P and an interpretation f * of a function˜f V, we can find a dense subforcing P ′ ⊂ P such that for every condition p ′ of P ′ there is a n(p ′ ) such that p ′ forces that f * (n(p ′ )) ˜f (n(p ′ )) (here we identify the P-name˜f with the equivalent P ′ -name). So f * cannot be a P ′ -interpretation of˜f . 
A    
In this section, we describe the ideas used in the proof, without being too rigorous.
(A) Use names. How can we show that the countable support limit of proper forcings is proper?
We have a countable support iteration (P α ,Q α ) α<ǫ of proper forcings (ǫ limit), N ≺ H(χ) countable, and p ∈ P ∩ N. We want to find a q ω ∈ P ǫ which forces that G is N-generic, i.e. that G ∩ D ∩ N ∅ for all dense subsets D ∈ N of P.
So we fix an ω-sequence 0 = α 0 < α 1 < . . . cofinal in ǫ ∩ N, and enumerate all dense open sets of P that are in N as (D n ) n∈ω .
One unsuccessful attempt to construct q ω could be the one illustrated in Figure 1 :
Of course this doesn't work, since we generally cannot find a p n ≤ p n−1 in D n such that q n−1 ≤ p n ↾α n .
What we actually do instead is the following (see Figure 2 ): The p n will be P α n -names, and the q n are P α n+1 -generic over N. So instead of choosing p n ∈ P ǫ , we choose (in N) a P α n -namep n for an element of P ǫ such that the following is forced by P α n :
It is clear that we can find such a name. So we first construct all thep n (eachp n is in N, but the sequence is not). Then we construct q n ∈ P α n+1 satisfying the following:
• q n extends q n−1 , • q n is P α n+1 -generic over N, and • q n is stronger thanp n on the interval [α n , α n+1 ). 6 So (by induction) q n forces thatp n ↾α n+1 ∈ G α n+1 and that thereforep n+1 ≤p n . So q ω = q n forces thatp n ↾α n ∈ G α (by definition ofp n ), thatp n ↾α n+1 ≥p n+1 ↾α n+1 ∈ G α n+1 and generally thatp n ↾α m ∈ G α m for all m > n. Therefore q ω forces thatp n ∈ G ǫ . Also, q n−1 is P α n -generic over N, and the P α n -namep n is in N, so q ω forces thatp n ∈ N ∩ P ǫ and
(B) Interpolate approximations. First note that for every P ǫ -name˜f ∈ C and for every p ∈ P ǫ we can find an approximation f * of˜f under p. If additionally 0 < α < ǫ and P α adds a new realr, then we can choose the witnesses of the approximation such that
* * such that the following is forced by P α (see Figure 3 ): (C) Approximate more and more functions better and better. In addition to all the dense sets D n of N -as in (A) -we also list all the P ǫ -names˜f n in N for elements of C. We have to make sure that q ω forces that˜f R η. We assume that every element of D n decides˜f m ↾n for m ≤ n. We start with an approximation f * 0 Inductively, we get a sequence (q n ) n∈ω such that q n ∈ P α n+1 extends q n−1 and forces 7 We call a set A ⊆ P inconsistent, if P forces that not every condition of A is in G.
•
Let q ω be the union of all q n . Then q ω forces the following: For m ≥ n,˜f n ↾m =˜f * m
(D) Decide when we are σ-complete. The proof so far relies on the fact that we can always find approximations whose witnesses are inconsistent. We already know that this is the case if the iteration between α n and α n+1 adds a new real. Actually we just need that the iterands are "nowhere σ-complete", i.e. that below every p we can find an inconsistent decreasing sequence.
If no reals are added, it might seem as we do not have anything to do (since Case A preservation is vacuous without new reals). The problem is that the countable support iteration of proper forcings which do not add reals can add a real in the limit. So it might be that we are unable to use new reals in the intermediate steps (which we want to construct inconsistent witnesses for approximations), but get new reals in the limit (which could be a problem for preservation).
On the other extreme, if all iterands are σ-complete, then the limit is σ-complete as well, and therefore adds no reals, so there is nothing to do.
So what to do? First note that we can split every forcing in a σ-complete and a nowhere σ-complete part. However, that does not solve our problem, since we can not split the index set ǫ of the iteration into ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 such that P α forces thatQ α is σ-complete if α ∈ ǫ 1 and nowhere σ-complete otherwise.
For example, Q 0 could add a Cohen realc, andQ n could be defined to be σ-complete iffc(n) = 0.
So we will do the following: Given a condition p ∈ P ǫ , there is a maximal γ ≤ ǫ such that P α forces thatQ α is σ-complete (below p(α)) for all α < γ. So if γ = ǫ, then the rest of the iteration is σ-complete. If γ < ǫ, then we strengthen p such that P γ forces thatQ γ is nowhere σ-complete (below p(γ)).
We will only be interested in honest approximations, that is an approximation witnessed by (p m ) m∈ω where p 0 (and therefore all p m ) will know the γ whereQ α stops to be σ-complete (in the way just described).
Since in (C) the conditionsp m n are P α n -names, the corresponding γ will be a P α n -name as well. In the iteration at stage n, we will have to distinguish three cases:
• {p m n−1 ↾α n } is inconsistent. Then continue as in (B).
• The γ corresponding top 0 n−1 is bigger than α n but less than ǫ. Then just "do nothing", i.e. wait in the iteration until α m is above γ and therefore the witnesses are inconsistent.
• Otherwise, we know that the rest of the iteration is σ-complete.
Again, we do not know from the beginning which case we will use at a given stage. In the example above, we will do nothing at stage n iffc(n) = 0 (so it will never happen that the rest of the iteration is σ-complete).
Also, when we "do nothing", we cannot increase the number of functions we approximate. In (C), the number k(n) of functions which we approximate in step n was n + 1 (˜f * n 0 , . . . , f * n n approximates˜f 0 , . . . , f n ). So in the proof this numberk n will be a P α n -name which isk n−1 in case "do nothing" and n + 1 otherwise.
T 
Definition 4.1. Let Q be a forcing, q ∈ Q.
• q is σ-complete in Q, if Q q ≔ {r ∈ Q : r ≤ q} is σ-complete. In this case we write q ∈ Q σ .
• q is nowhere σ-complete in Q if there is no q ′ ≤ Q q such that q ′ ∈ Q σ . In this case we write q ∈ Q ¬σ .
• Q is decisive if every q ∈ Q is either 1 Q (the weakest element of Q) or σ-complete or nowhere σ-complete. We will show that in this case P ǫ is densely preserving, 10 so P 0 ǫ is densely preserving as well, proving Theorem 2.4.
From now on we fix the iteration (P α ,Q α ) α<ǫ satisfying 4.4. We also fix a regular χ ≫ 2 |P ǫ | , a countable N ≺ H(χ) containing (P α ,Q α ) α<ǫ , and an η covering N.
Definition 4.5.
We will use the following notation (α ≤ β):
• If p ∈ G β , r ∈ P α and r ≤ p↾α, then we can define r ∧ p ∈ G β , the weakest condition stronger than r and p.
• G α is the P α -generic filter over V (or its canonical name).
• P β /G α is the P α -name for the forcing consisting of those P β -conditions p such that p↾α ∈ G α (with the same order as P β ).
• In V α : If p ∈ P β /G α , then p (α,β) ϕ means p P β /G α ϕ. We also say "p (α, β)-forces ϕ".
• The function P β → P α * P β /G α defined by p → (p↾α, p) is a dense embedding.
• If p 1 ∈ P α andp 2 is a P α -name for an element of P β /G α , then
Ifp is a P α -name for an element of P β /G α , then αp (α,β) ϕ does not imply that p[G α ] (which is an element of P β and therefore of V) forces ϕ in V (as element of P α ). I.e. V ( αp (α,β) ϕ) does not imply α (V p β ϕ). We will use the following straightforward technical facts: Lemma 4.7. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ γ ≤ β ≤ ǫ. P α forces: 8 Of course it is possible to have 1 Q ∈ Q σ or 1 Q ∈ Q ¬σ . 9 Where G Pα ≔ {p ∈ P α : (∃p ′ ∈ G P ′ α ) ϕ α (p ′ ) ≤ p} is the canonic P α -generic filter over V. 10 Note that we do not claim that P ǫ is preserving.
(1) If p ∈ P β /G α , q ∈ P γ /G α , and q (α,γ) p↾γ ∈ G γ , then we can define p ′ = q∧(p↾β\γ) in P β /G α such that p ′ ↾γ = q and p From now on, to distinguish between P β -names and P α -names for some α < β, we denote P β -names (in V as well as P α -names for such names) with a tilde under the symbol (e.g.τ) and we denote P α -names for V α objects that are not P β -names (but could be P β conditions) with a dot under the symbol (e.g.τ). In particular we write (P α ,Q α ) α<ǫ .
i ↾m for all m ∈ ω and i < k.
• "f * is an honest (α, β)-approximation of˜f under p" means that there is a γ and
(2) Assume that p is an element of P β /G α , k a natural number, (˜f i ) i<k a k-sequence of P β -names for elements of C, and D a dense subset of P β /G α . Then there are p
Proof. We just show (2) . Work in V α . Let α ≤ γ < β be minimal such that p↾γ (α,γ) p(γ) ∈Q σ γ . If there is no such γ, set γ = β and p 2 = p. Otherwise pick an r ≤ p↾γ in P γ /G α such that r (α,γ) p(γ) ∈Q ¬σ γ , and set p 2 = p ∧ r.
11 if ζ dom(p), then p(ζ) is defined to be 1 Q ζ . In this case p(ζ) ∈ Q σ ζ means that Q ζ is σ-complete. So it is possible that γ ≥ α + ω 1 , this is no contradiction to countable support. Induction Lemma 4.10. Assume that q ∈ P α and that the following are in N: α ≤ β ≤ ǫ, the P α -namesṗ,k,˙f * = (˙f * i ) i∈k and the P β -name˜f = (˜f i ) i∈k for elements of C. Assume that q forces
Then there is a q + ∈ P β such that q + ↾α = q and q + forces
We prove the lemma by induction on β. For α = β there is nothing to do. We split the proof into two cases: β successor and β limit.
Proof for the case β = ζ + 1 successor. Letṗ m be P α -names for witnesses of the approximation.
First assume that q ∈ G ζ (i.e. q ∈ G ζ ∩ P α = G α ) and work in V ζ . Set p −1 = 1 P β . Let −1 ≤ m * ≤ ω be the supremum of {m :ṗ m ↾ζ ∈ G ζ }. So by fact 4.9. (1), q forces that˙f * is an honest (α, ζ)-approximation of˙f * * underṗ↾ζ. By the induction hypothesis there is an N-generic q + ∈ P ζ which forces thatṗ 
Proof for the case β limit. Choose a cofinal, increasing sequence (α n ) n∈ω in β∩ N such that α = α 0 . Let (D n ) n∈ω enumerate a basis of the open dense subsets of P β that are in N, and (g n ) n∈ω all P β -names in N for elements of C. We may assume that D 0 = P β , D n+1 ⊆ D n and that every p ∈ D n+1 decidesg m ↾n for 0 ≤ m ≤ n as well ask and˜f i ↾n for 0 ≤ i ≤k.
Letγ 0 and (ṗ m 0 ) m∈ω be P α 0 -names for witnesses of the approximation in the assumption.
By induction on n ≥ 1 we can construct the following P α n -names in N:
a sequence of conditions in P β /G α n , γ n an ordinal, k n a natural number ≥k n−1 ,f * n = (˙f * n i ) i<k n ak n -sequence of functions from ω to ω, such that (for n ≥ 1) P α n forces thatṗ 0 n−1 ↾α n ∈ G α n implies
12
•f * n is an honest (α n ,γ n , β)-approximation off n witnessed by (ṗ All we need for this construction is 4.9 (2) . Note that in all three casesṗ 0 n ≤ṗ 0 n−1 ; in casė A n orḂ nṗ 0 n ∈ D n and thereforeṗ 0 n (α n ,β)˜f n i ↾n =˙f * n ↾n for i < n. In caseḂ n ,γ n is again β, in caseĊ n ,γ n =γ n−1 . In all three cases, f * n is an honest (α n , γ n , α n+1 )-approximation witnessed by (ṗ ↾m. Next we construct (by induction on n ≥ 0) q n ∈ P α n+1 such that q n ↾α n = q n−1 and q n forces:
) i<k n+1 witnessed by (ṗ m n+1 ↾α n+2 ) m∈ω . We can do this simply by applying the induction lemma iteratively: Given q n−1 , we choose q n using 4.10 as induction hypothesis, setting
• n∈ω k n = ω, and infinitely often case A n or case B n holds:
If γ m = β for some m, then case B n holds (and k n = n) for all n > m. Whenever α m+1 ≤ γ m < β (i.e. case C m+1 holds), then for some n > m (the smallest n such that α n > γ m ) case A n holds and therefore k n = n.
• G β is N-generic.
Let D ∈ N be dense. Then D ⊇ D m ∈ N, and for some n ≥ m, case A n or case B n holds. Therefore p
12 or: This ends the proof of the limit case.
Note that the iteration lemma applied to the case α = 0 does not immediately give the preservation theorem 2.4, since we only get preservation for honest approximations. This turns out to be no problem, however. Let us recall the structure of the proof:
Assume that (P 0 α ,Q 0 α ) α∈ǫ is a proper countable support iteration such that P 0 α forces that Q 0 α is densely preserving for all α.
• Define P • Let (P α ,Q α ) be the countable support iteration as in Fact 4.3, obtained from Q 2 α . In particular P α forces that Q α is decisive and preserving (so we can apply the induction lemma), and P α can be densely embedded into P 0 α for all α ≤ ǫ.
• Set P ′ ≔ {1 P ǫ } ∪ {p ∈ P ǫ : (∃γ ≤ ǫ) (γ = ǫ ∨ p↾γ γ p(γ) ∈ Q ¬σ ) & (∀α < γ)p↾α α p(α) ∈ Q σ }. P ′ is a dense subforcing of P ǫ and therefore of P 0 ǫ . We assign to every p ∈ P ′ \{1 P ′ } the (unique) corresponding γ(p). If q ≤ p, then γ(q) = γ(p).
• We claim that P ′ is preserving (this finishes the proof of the iteration theorem 
